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OBSERVER MISSIONS AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS 
IN CROATIA, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, AND KOSOVO
This paper deals with the collective security system as provided in Chapters VI, VII 
and VIII of the UN Charter. Observer missions and peace-keeping operations have 
no explicit legal basis in the text of the Char ter. They have developed in practice. 
Each of them is based on decisions either by the Security Council, or sometimes 
even by the General Assembly.
The second part of this article is consecrated to the UN Protection Forces (UNPRO-
FOR) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In spite of its name, and although 
equipped with armed weapons, the UNPROFOR was in fact a con cealed observer 
mission. It had no mandate for peace-keeping, that what was ex pected from it by the 
Croa tian public. It did not halt the crimes against civi lians in the four parts (UN-
PA-s) of Croatia occupied by Serbs. Neither did it ensure the return of displaced 
persons to their homes, what was necessary to create the con ditions for the free and 
demo cratic elec tions in these Croatian areas endowed with the “spe cial sta tus”. 
The deception was much higher with the UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzego vina. 
From originally an observer mission like that in Croatia, it was latter on entrusted 
with the peace-keeping, but never with a clear mandate suf ficient for performing its 
rapidly expanded duties. It was never au thori zed to use force beyond that required 
in self-defence, and in order to secure the transportation of humanitarian aid. For 
instance, the city of Sara jevo was surrounded by the Serbian troops from April 1992 
to September 1995 with enormous sufferings of civilians, thus even longer than the 
siege of Leningrad during World War II. The genocide in Srebre nica that happened 
in June 1995 was not pre vented, although there were sufficient weapons, but not the 
will to do that. Therefore, that peace-keeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a 
fiasco for the UN, the same as that in Somalia in 1993. 
After a review of crimes committed by the Serbian authorities against the Albanian 
majority population in Kosovo, in Spring 1999 ensued the NATO bombing action 
on the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugos lavia. Due to the opposition by 
Russia and China, that enforcement action was not authorized by the UN Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This article deals in particular with 
the problem whether in a situation of extreme necessity which dictates the deter-
rence of a worst evil, a humani tarian inter ven tion by armed forces is under the 
present inter national law legitimate. 
Keywords: Collective security; United Nations; Enforcement measures; Measures 
not involving the use of force; Observer missions; Peace-keeping operations; UN-
PROFOR; NATO. 
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The activities of observer missions and peace-keeping operations within the 
collective security system as established in the UN practice after the World War 
II constitute an important part of recent Croatian history and history of some 
other Successor States of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Nevertheless, students of some Croatian Faculties of Law and attendees of the 
Zagreb Diplomatic Academy learn almost nothing about it. Politicians and dip-
lomats, as well as journalists as opinion-makers have even less knowledge of 
these important legal matters. Consequently, our public has been rather frustrated 
by the UN actions, which were otherwise also encumbered with insufficient and 
inadequate decisions of the Security Council and with reluctance of the so-called 
“international community” to confront the situation in these territories between 
1991 and 1999.
I - COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEMS
Collective security systems are based on complex and long-term legal com-
mitments of their Member States to a collective action in case somebody tries to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. They were estab-
lished on the values of a given age. These systems, inter alia, set out obligations 
of the States in pacific settlement of international disputes in order to prevent 
conflicts, and also obligations concerning a collective action of their Member 
States under previously provided conditions.
Throughout the history three such systems were exercised with varying suc-
cess in order to maintain European and world peace. They were: the Holy Alli-
ance (1815-1830), the League of Nations (1919-1946), and the United Nations 
established by the 1945 Charter.1
The UN Charter laid down six principal and a cluster of subsidiary organs, as 
well as UN specialized agencies. According to the Charter, the three principal UN 
organs are important for the collective security system.
1. The Security Council is politically the most important organ. It is an execu-
tive organ of the UN with the powers to adopt instant, legally binding decisions 
for all Member States of this world organization. It consists of five permanent 
Member States as laid down by the Charter (the United States of America, the 
current Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, China and France), and 10 non-permanent members elected by the Gen-
eral Assembly for a term of two years. However, no obligatory decision may be 
adopted by the Security Council within its competence if it is vetoed by any of 
the permanent Members. 
1 For more see – V. Đ. Degan: Međunarodno pravo i međunarodna sigurnost, Sarajevo 1982, pp. 
13-39.
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The Security Council does not have general competence. The principal com-
petence – and responsibility – of the Security Council is the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security (Article 24(1) of the Charter). When it establishes 
itself the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggres-
sion in any part of the world (Chapter VII of the Charter), it may, besides recom-
mendations, also bring binding decisions for all or only some Member States.
2. The General Assembly is the only plenary and democratic organ of the 
UN in which each Member State is represented by one vote. In contrast with the 
Security Council, it has general competence and may discuss any matter within 
the framework of the Charter, including the matters of the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. However, contrary to the Security Council, it may in 
principle merely adopt recommendations for the Member States and other UN 
organs. 
3. The UN Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security 
Council any matter which he thinks may threaten the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. However, he has not often used this power. In dispute 
settlements he performs functions vested in him by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly.
Occasionally, the Secretary-General may take independent actions to settle 
disputes threatening international peace. He may offer his good offices or media-
tion activity to parties to a dispute discretely, or even secretly. If he should so 
decide, he is to proceed within the frameworks of previously adopted resolutions 
of the Security Council or the General Assembly. If his action turns out to be suc-
cessful, the achieved dispute settlement may be subsequently approved by one of 
these organs.
It should also be pointed out that the Secretary General may not exercise his 
powers and responsibilities successfully unless he enjoys political confidence of 
each of the five permanent Member States of the Security Council.
*
The UN collective security system is laid down in Chapters VI, VII and VIII 
of the Charter. The parts thereof refer to: pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter 
VI), action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts 
of aggression (Chapter VII), and regional arrangements and agencies (Chapter 
VIII). The most important role in this system is the role of the Security Council, 
while the General Assembly has a subsidiary role. These mechanisms shall be 
briefly outlined below.2
2 For a number of cases referring to the practice of the UN organs see – NGUYEN QUOC 
DINH: Droit international public, Patrick Daillier et Alain Pellet, 7e édition Paris 2002, pp. 
842–853, 989–1021.
Vladimir-Đuro Degan: OBSERVER MISSIONS AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS...; 9-28
ADRIAS svezak 14, 2007.
12
*
Pacific settlement of disputes according to Chapter VI of the Charter. The 
Charter uncommonly separates this procedure from the one in Chapter VII, and 
sets out completely distinct powers of the Security Council therein.
According to the Charter, the parties to any dispute shall, first of all, seek a 
solution of their own choice. If the negotiation or any other means of settlement 
should fail, they have an obligation to refer their dispute with such characteris-
tics to the Security Council (Article 37(1)). Under Chapter VI of the Charter, the 
Security Council is entitled to keep under its control any dispute that is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace, but it may only make rec-
ommendations to the parties concerned. In order to exercise its functions under 
Chapter VI, but also with Chapter VII, the Security Council is politically required 
to obtain an agreement by its five permanent Member States. In former times, 
when this cooperation did not exist, it was unable to carry out its responsibilities 
in many critical situations.
If none of the permanent Members blocks its action, the Security Council uti-
lizes all available diplomatic means to settle disputes. Deliberations in public are 
accompanied by negotiations conducted behind the scenes and efforts made to 
persuade all parties to find a solution to their dispute, even by means of blackmail, 
and especially threats implying that enforcement action shall be taken against the 
party that refuses to adopt the solution offered under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Thereby, in order to resolve a conflict, the Security Council sometimes imposes 
the terms of the dispute settlement to the parties concerned.
Thus the differences with respect to the powers of the Security Council under 
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter have become obliterated in practice, because 
the process of dispute settlement serves to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.
*
(b) Chapter VII of the Charter. In contrast to its powers in Chapter VI, if the 
Security Council establishes the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression anywhere in the world, then under Chapter VII 
it may adopt binding decisions, in addition to recommendations, for all or only 
some UN Member States, as it may decide. As pointed out above, it is politically 
required that all five permanent Members take action in mutual agreement. As a 
consequence, if any of them is itself an aggressor State, or if an act of aggression 
has been committed by any other state under its protection (e.g. Israel in Lebanon 
in 2006) the Security Council has no power to carry out its primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security. Then the result is the 
blockade of the UN collective security system, as it happened, for instance, in the 
13
Kosovo case. In 1999 NATO conducted a bombing action in the territory of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, on its own, and without any 
authorization of the Security Council. Similarly, in 2003 the United States and the 
United Kingdom carried out an armed intervention in Iraq, which is still lasting, 
in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime.
In absence of a blockade of the permanent Members, this organ may order to 
the UN Member States two types of measures.
*
Measures not involving the use of armed force. The Security Council has a 
wide range of measures it may employ to give effect to its decisions. It may call 
upon all UN Member States, or only some of them, to apply such measures. They 
may be of economic, political or any other nature, and include: “complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic rela-
tions.” (Article 41)
Since the mid 1960s the Security Council has been increasingly imposing 
such measures by its decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter, for instance: 
against the racist regime in Rhodesia (1966-1980); against Iraq during the Kuwait 
invasion from 1990 to 2003; against Libya from 1992 to 1999; in the territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1996; against Liberia since 1992 and Haiti 
since 1993, etc.
At the beginning of an internal conflict without a designated aggressor the 
Security Council almost automatically imposes a general and complete embargo 
on all deliveries of weapons to the affected country.
The Security Council may also impose economic sanctions upon a hostile 
party that involve prohibition of business transactions and freezing of the assets 
of the state concerned and its overseas companies; prohibition of air transporta-
tion with this country; blockade of its ports and merchant ships in foreign ports, 
etc. All UN Member States are legally bound to implement the above measures, 
unless they have been exempted by the Security Council.3
The weakness of economic and other non-violent measures lies in their long-
term effectiveness. Moreover, they only affect the civilian population of the state 
concerned (including the minorities who may merely be victims of its oppressive 
regime), and not the power-holders who are determined to extend their aggres-
sive and criminal politics. They are certainly not a means of rapid termination of 
extended international crimes these power-holders are responsible for.
3 All generally recognized states in the world are currently members of the UN, with the only 
exception of the Vatican City State.
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(ii) Enforcement action. Where the Security Council feels that the measures 
short of armed force would be inadequate, or if they have already proved to be 
inadequate, it may take “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-
sary to maintain or restore international peace and security.“ 
There have only been three differently established enforcement actions con-
ducted on the following occasions: (a) in South Korea, the UN reaction to the 
North Korean invasion (1950-1953); (b) during suppression of the separatist mu-
tiny in the Congolese Province of Katanga (currently Shabl) (1963); and during 
suppression of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq at the beginning of 1991. Only 
the latter was conducted in accordance with the provisions in Chapter VII of the 
Charter, because it was a joint action of all permanent Members of the Security 
Council. A more thorough description is thus required at this point.
On the same date of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 the Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 660 unanimously, thereby condemning the inva-
sion and calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq. According 
to Resolution 662 of 9 August the Security Council declared that the purported 
Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was null and void. All states and international or-
ganizations were called upon to refrain from any action or dealing that may be 
interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.
Nevertheless, aware of Iraq’s unsatisfactory compliance with the foregoing 
and some other resolutions and measures, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 678 on 29 November 1990, thereby allowing Iraq one final opportunity to 
withdraw from Kuwait and comply with all resolutions. Thereby it also autho-
rized Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait (in exile) to 
“use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 
660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace 
and security in the area.” This formula was its authorization for a military inter-
vention.
The given deadline expired on 15 January 1991. The day after a coalition of 
states under the leadership of the United States undertook an enforcement action 
by land, air and naval forces and inflicted a military defeat on Iraq. It expelled all 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait and temporarily occupied a portion of the Iraqi border 
territory. Despite the defeat, Saddam Hussein managed to remain in power in 
Baghdad. This action was taken under the supervision of the Security Council, 
but not under its command. On 16 January 1991 its Military Staff Committee 
ceased to have any actual responsibility.
This example has shown that mutual cooperation between the five permanent 
Members of the Security Council renders the enforcement action feasible under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. It is also rendered feasible despite a lack of con-
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cluded agreements between all UN Members on availability of their contingents 
of armed forces to the Security Council, as provided by Article 43 of the Charter. 
Hence, an intervention may be undertaken pursuant to Article 42, independent of 
Article 43.
*
(c) Chapter VIII of the Charter. In regard to the use of armed forces of mili-
tary alliances or ad hoc coalitions in foreign countries, Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter is explicit: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such 
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But 
no enforcement action shall be taken … without the authorization of the Security 
Council …” (Article 53(1))
The above wording would imply that the enforcement action by such forces 
(e.g. the bombing action of NATO forces in the territory of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in 1999), without any prior authorization of the Security Council, 
would be in contradiction with the UN Charter. Then it would be evaluated in 
conformity with the criteria laid down in the Definition of Aggression according 
to the Resolution of the General Assembly in 1974. Under such circumstances 
this action may be treated as an act of aggression.
*
The above provisions of the Charter have remained a legal framework for ac-
tions of the international community until the present day. Nevertheless, during 
sixty years of practice they have been continuously developed. The international 
action has sometimes suffered spectacular failures, particularly when actions of 
the permanent members of the Security Council were discordant.
Collective actions that may be taken within or outside the UN can be divided 
into: (i) observer missions; (ii) peace-keeping operations, and (iii) enforcement 
actions under Chapter VII of the Charter outlined above.
The first two types may not be attested by the wording of the Charter, al-
though observer missions could, nevertheless, be subsumed under Chapter VI 
of the Charter. Some authors characterize peacekeeping operations, established 
in practice, as “Chapter VI bis of the Charter”. Their provisions are likely to be 
entered into the wording of the Charter on the occasion of its first thorough revi-
sion.4
4 In 1993 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published an extensive document enti-
tled An Agenda for Peace. Therein he sought to categorize types of actions taken or supposed 
to be taken by the UN. Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between 
parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of 
the latter when they occur. For this purpose some endeavours are recommended such as fact-
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When deploying observer and peace-keeping missions in an area, the UN or-
gans and the missions alike adhere to three principles: (i) prior consent of hostile 
parties (whether in internal or international conflict); (ii) impartiality toward all 
parties; and (iii) the non-use of force (other than in self-defence). Therefore, these 
actions are distinct from those taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII 
of the Charter.
Observer missions dispose with a relatively small number of personnel. Their 
duty is to monitor and report to those they have been deployed by. Their officers 
are unarmed, or have only light arms for personal use. They are incapable of 
physical resistance against any unlawful conduct of the parties in conflict.
Very early the Security Council and the General Assembly started to deploy 
such missions in some parts of the world to supervise compliance with and execu-
tion of a resolution or a cease-fire agreement between hostile parties.
The first UN observer mission was deployed in 1947 in Greece, engulfed in 
civil war at the time, according to General Assembly Resolution 109. The ob-
servers supervised the Greek side of the border to detect arms and ammunition 
arriving for Greek rebels from the neighbouring countries (especially Yugosla-
via). The mission lasted until 1954. However, the uprising was suppressed much 
earlier after Yugoslavia, following its conflict with the Soviet Union in July 1949, 
had closed its border with Greece and thus in fact betrayed the rebels whom it had 
actively assisted and encouraged before.
In 1948 according to Security Council Resolution 50 military observers were 
deployed in the then Palestine to supervise the interim cease-fire achieved the 
same year. The same year according to Security Council Resolution 47 observers 
were deployed in India and Pakistan to supervise the cease-fire in Jammu and 
Kashmir. This observer mission, to the best of our knowledge, is still lasting. 
Similarly, there are observer missions in many other parts of the world nowadays. 
Some of them also involve Croatian Army officers.
Peace-keeping operations involve the UN armed forces that are established 
between the hostile parties in such a way that the recurrence of a conflict would 
finding, good services and good offices and good faith missions. Peacemaking is action to 
bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those set out 
in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Finally, peace-keeping is the deployment 
of a UN presence in the field. In other words, these are the mentioned observer and peace-
keeping missions. Peace building is action to identify and support structures which will tend 
to strengthen and solidify peace. Peace enforcement is peacekeeping without the consent of 
the parties in conflict, and is conducted in accordance with the provisions in Chapter VII of the 
Charter. However, this world’s organization suffered a fiasco during Boutros-Ghali’s mandate 
(1992-1997), in, inter alia, Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992, also including the massacre in 
Srebrenica in 1995, in Somalia in 1993, and in Rwanda, where between half a million and 
800,000 civilians were killed between 6 April and 17 July 1994.
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be made possible only if these forces were attacked, which, in turn, would reveal 
the aggressor. However, this distinction is not rigid. A former observer mission 
may subsequently be authorized as a peace-keeping mission.
The British and French military intervention in the area of the Suez Canal in 
Egypt and the concomitant occupation of the Sinai Peninsula by Israel between 
October and December in 1956 induced the first urgent extraordinary session of 
the General Assembly according to its Resolution “Uniting for Peace” in 1950. 
According to Resolution (998-ES-I) of 4 November 1956, the General Assem-
bly, with the “consent of the nations concerned”, established “an United Nations 
Emergency Force” (UNEF).
The first “Blue Helmets” thus came into being. This armed formation, com-
posed of several different national contingents (including the ones of the Former 
Yugoslavia) was assigned to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the Sinai Peninsula, and deployed on the Egyptian side of the bor-
der with Israel to prevent future armed conflicts of the two parties. These forces 
were performing their mission of separation there until their withdrawal upon the 
Egyptian request on 19 May 1967, prior to the “Six Day War”. In that war Egypt, 
Jordan and Iraq suffered a severe military defeat, whose consequences are still 
remaining.
These peace-keeping missions were followed by many others in different 
parts of the world, including in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. Besides 
the separation of hostile parties, these missions also aim to reconcile tensions in 
the territory. However, they may also obtain many other different assignments 
during their mandate: to exercise interim administrative functions in an area 
(e.g. in Cambodia, or Croatian Podunavlje); to supervise the compliance with 
the agreements on human rights and repatriation of refugees; to supervise elec-
tions; to train local police forces; to control peace treaties; to supervise troop 
withdrawal agreements and demilitarized (demobilized) zones; to assist in mine 
removal actions, etc.
Therefore, these armed peace-keeping missions are considerably distinct 
from the enforcement action of UN forces that are deployed in a territory under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but which are nevertheless established against an 
aggressor in an international or internal conflict.
II - OBSERVER MISSIONS AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE 
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
During the open attacks of the Former Yugoslav People’s Army in Croatia (in 
Vukovar, other Podunavlje areas, and Western Slavonia), a general and complete 
embargo was imposed on all deliveries of weapons to Yugoslavia by Resolution 
713 of 25 September 1991, which was not lifted until the end of 1995. This non-
selective measure soon proved to be counterproductive. It was mitigating for the 
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Serbian side in the conflict that had unlawfully seized the largest quantities of 
weapons of the Former Yugoslav People’s Army, and aggravating for its victims 
who often did not have any means of defence. Consequently, the embargo, in 
fact, merely prolonged the conflict in Croatia, and particularly in Bosnia-Herze-
govina.
Previously, in accordance with the Brijuni Agreement of 7 July 1991 an un-
armed observer mission was inter alia also established by the CSCE (originally 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, but currently the Organi-
zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) with its headquarters in Zagreb. 
Initially, it only supervised the cease-fire in Slovenia. However, after escalation 
of the triumphal invasion of the Yugoslav People’s Army, particularly in Western 
Slavonia and Croatian Podunavlje, it increased its personnel and on 1 Septem-
ber expanded its observation activities to Croatia, as well. Comparable to other 
observer missions, it supervised the state of affairs and submitted reports to its 
superiors. Nonetheless, it could not resolve the conflict, and neither could it pre-
vent crimes, e.g. the crimes in Vukovar, which caused feelings of frustration in 
Croatia. This mission was subsequently authorized by the same Security Council 
Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991 which imposed the embargo on all deliver-
ies of weapons to Yugoslavia.
When the first Croatian Constitutional Law on the Rights of Ethnic and Na-
tional Communities was adopted at the beginning of December 1991, there was 
still hope that it would be possible to implement its provisions in good faith. It 
was believed that, after the UN forces had been deployed in the occupied territo-
ries, it would be feasible to ensure peaceful repatriation of all refugees and after-
wards, after free and multiparty elections in municipalities with a special status 
(i.e. with the Serbian majority), to establish all self-governing bodies together 
with the local police, with proportionate participation in power of both Serbian 
and the Croatian population. However, none of the above came true.
Following the Sarajevo Cease-Fire Agreement in Croatia of 2 January 1992, 
the Security Council established the “United Nations Protection Force” (UNPRO-
FOR) according to Resolution 743 of 21 February the same year. This armed, 
but essentially an observer mission was to be of an interim character, until the 
negotiations resulted in conflict settlement. These forces were deployed in four 
Croatian zones seized by the Serbs at the time (UNPAs), i.e. in Eastern and West-
ern Slavonia, and Krajina, which was divided into the north and the south zones. 
This entire region was to be demilitarized. The Serbian militia weapons were to 
be stored and supervised by UNPROFOR, and the Yugoslav People’s Army and 
the Croatian National Guard were obliged to leave the territory.
Nevertheless, the function of these forces was not to prevent crimes, but to 
supervise the cease-fire and safeguard humanitarian relief convoys. They were 
not allowed to use weapons for purposes other than self-defence. Therefore, UN-
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PROFOR completely failed to protect non-Serbian civilians, to demilitarize the 
region, and, most of all, to enable repatriation of refugees to their former homes. 
These weaknesses were subsequently even more evident in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
while the peace-keeping operations in Somalia suffered a complete failure in 
1993.
In subsequent months the UNPROFOR mandate was territorially extended. 
By Resolution 762 of 30 June 1992 UNPROFOR was authorized to monitor 
the areas still under the Yugoslav People’s Army control in southern Croatia. 
By Resolution 779 of 6 October the same year it assumed a new responsibil-
ity for monitoring of the Yugoslav People’s Army withdrawal from the vicinity 
of Dubrovnik, and the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula. Accordingly, 
throughout its activities in Croatia and despite being armed, UNPROFOR in fact 
had an observer mission mandate.5
*
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina deteriorated long before, but especially 
after the results of the independence referendum of the country were published 
on 6 March 1992. They were followed by an open aggression of the Yugoslav 
People’s Army.
Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992 demanded that any elements of the Croatian 
Army still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina act in accordance with paragraph 4 
of Resolution 752 of 15 May 1992. They should have been withdrawn or placed 
under the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo.
However, this resolution only imposed economic and other sanctions on the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). By this and subsequent 
resolutions the Security Council gradually introduced increasingly more severe 
economic sanctions upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), including the suspension of business transactions and air transportation 
(Resolutions 752, 757 (of 30 May) and Resolution 787 (1992)). They were ex-
tended to the territories controlled by the Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia, concurrently with freezing of assets of the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia and its overseas companies, and blockade of its ports, as well as mer-
chant ships in overseas ports (820 (1993)).6
5 An extensive overview of different Security Council’s resolutions concerning the UNPRO-
FOR mandate in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia is provided in -- Malcolm N. SHAW: 
International Law, Fourth Edition, Cambridge University Press 1997, pp. 868-872.
6 After the Dayton Peace Agreements had been signed, these measures against the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia in accordance with  Resolution 1022 of 22 November 1995 were first 
indefinitely suspended (except temporarily with  respect to the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-
Herzegovina), only to be terminated by Resolution 1074 (1996).
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Never before in history had the Security Council ordered more severe sanc-
tions upon any country. However, they did not induce the Government in Bel-
grade and the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina to restrain from their aggres-
sive politics.
According to Resolution 758 of 8 June 1992 military observers were deployed 
in Sarajevo by stronger UNPROFOR forces. Thus UNPROFOR also obtained the 
observer mission mandate in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Under Chapter VII of the Charter, in Resolution 770 of 13 August 1992 the 
Security Council called upon all states to “take nationally or through regional 
agencies or arrangements all measures necessary” to facilitate in coordination 
with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian 
organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever 
needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The phrase “all measures nec-
essary” permits in the UN terminology the resort to force. Under Chapter VII of 
the Charter the enforcement action thus seemed to be imminent.
Resolution 776 of 14 September 1992 authorized the augmentation of the 
UNPROFOR mandate and strength in Bosnia-Herzegovina to protect humanitar-
ian relief convoys and convoys of released detainees if requested by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross. However, in the Secretary General’s Report 
approved by the Security Council, it was noted that the normal peace-keeping 
rules of engagement would be followed by UNPROFOR so that force could be 
used in self-defence only, particularly where attempts were made to prevent the 
carrying out of the mandate. Nevertheless, this new resolution made no mention 
of either Chapter VII of the Charter, or “all measures necessary”. Thus, owing to 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali UNPROFOR was degraded to a peacekeeping 
mission. Consequently, its mandate became insufficient for the performance of 
the assigned tasks, and, moreover, it had not been sufficiently clearly set forth 
either.
Further stage of development of the UNPROFOR’s role involved the adoption 
of the 2”no-fly” bans imposed on military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
occupied parts of Croatia, which covered flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing 
aircrafts, by Resolution 781 of 9 October 1992. By Resolution 816 (1993), adopt-
ed under Chapter VII of the Charter, the ban on military flights was reaffirmed. At 
the request of the UN Secretary-General the no-fly zone was enforced by aircraft 
from NATO. A “double key” system was put into operation under which decisions 
on targeting and the use of NATO airpower were to be taken jointly by UN and 
NATO commanders and the principle of proportionality in response to violations 
was affirmed. The double key in effect implied a double-veto.
Previously, Resolution 815 (1993) established several “safe areas” in Bosnia-
Herzegovina with a majority Moslem population, but completely surrounded by 
Serbian forces. Although Chapter VII of the Charter was referred to in this reso-
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lution, it was cited only in the context of the security of UNPROFOR personnel. 
Hence, in the enforcement of the “safe areas” UNPROFOR personnel was also 
authorised to use force only to protect themselves.7
Although UNPROFOR tried to remain neutral in this conflict and retain con-
fidence of all parties – it was not authorized to respond to the civilian massa-
cre committed with artillery shells in Sarajevo – in the Spring of 1995 relations 
between the Serbian side and UNPROFOR started to deteriorate rapidly. The 
Serbian side breached the Sarajevo No Heavy Weapons Arrangement, which pre-
cipitated symbolic NATO air strikes of some of its positions in the vicinity of 
Goražde. 
Subsequently, the Serbian side captured several hundred UNPROFOR mem-
bers and held them hostage, while some of them were kept physically tied up 
around Serbian military facilities as a live bulwark against potential strikes. After 
these hostages had been released, the Serbian forces occupied the UN protected 
area in Srebrenica, killed about eight thousand men, and forced all other Moslem 
population into exile. The NATO forces launched severe air strikes only after-
wards and destroyed all Serbian means of communication in several days.
Previously, all Croatian zones, except the Podunavlje zone, were liberated 
during the “Flash” and “Storm” operations. Also in Bosnia-Herzegovina the 
Croatian and the Bosnian sides liberated vast territories, and consequently the 
Serbs lost their military supremacy. The Cease-Fire Agreement, concluded on 12 
October 1995, was the first agreement the Serbian side complied with.8
As a consequence of the Dayton Peace Agreement initialled on 25 Novem-
ber 1995, in accordance with the Security Council’s authorization by Resolution 
1031 UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina was replaced by a multinational im-
plementation force under the name of IFOR (subsequently SFOR). These forces 
no longer represented a UN peace-keeping mission, but their actions were author-
ized by the Security Council, and thus complied with the provision in Chapter 
VIII of the Charter. The UN International Police Task Force was also set up there 
to carry out local police related training and assistance missions.
7 At the request of the UN Secretary-General, NATO established 3 kilometre ‘total exclusion 
zones’ around the safe areas, but the Goražde ‘military exclusion zone’ was 20 kilometres 
wide. The Sarajevo ‘heavy weapons exclusion zone’ was 20 kilometres wide, wherefrom all 
heavy weapons needed to be evacuated. These zones were to be enforced by air strikes if nec-
essary, but any such decision was to be brought in accordance with the double key system.
8 Previously, in March 1995, the UN peace-keeping operations were restructured in the entire 
region. UNPROFOR had only stayed in Bosnia-Herzegovina before it was phased out at the 
end of the year. UNCRO (the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation) was estab-
lished in the territory of Croatia and it was operational in Podunavlje. In Macedonia a small 
military observer mission was established under the name of UNPREDEP (the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force), which is currently also operational there.
Vladimir-Đuro Degan: OBSERVER MISSIONS AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS...; 9-28
ADRIAS svezak 14, 2007.
22
The UN peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina failed largely due to 
territorial aggression and occupation by heavily armed Serbian forces. The arms 
embargo required deployment of the UN armed forces with a clear mandate under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, as was the case in suppression of the Iraqi aggression 
against Kuwait.
From an interim observer mission UNPROFOR was transformed into a peace-
keeping mission, but without a sufficient mandate. It was practically never au-
thorized to use force beyond that required in self-defence. A large fleet of NATO 
countries blocked the Montenegrin coast in the Adriatic, but in front of its very 
eyes the oil was entering into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Albania 
by land. In the autumn of 1991 the mere presence of a single aircraft carrier in 
front of Dubrovnik, if it had been sent there, would have most likely prevented 
the siege of the city, the fall of Vukovar and the tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and subsequently in Kosovo.
The NATO combat aircrafts were constantly leaving their bases in Italy and 
flying over the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the occupied Croatian ter-
ritories, but were completely useless until August and September 1995. Even the 
decisive air strike on Serbian facilities might not have followed, if the remaining 
safe areas and NATO’s complete fiasco had not been at stake. The UNPROFOR 
mandate was always extended as a result of some traumatic events, in which the 
UN Secretary General and some permanent Members of the Security Council did 
not want to recognize the actual aggressor.
*
The Kosovo situation should be considered from that aspect. Notwithstand-
ing the expectations of the Albanian side, the Dayton Agreements did not affect 
the position of this province at all. Albanians, who were exposed to many per-
secutions and unlawful murders since the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy in 
1989, replaced their passive resistance with an armed rebellion.
The Kosovo Liberation Army was established in 1996, but its more severe 
conflicts with the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police began in 1998.9 The 
Serbian side retaliated with mass crimes against Albanian civilians. In Resolution 
1199 of 23 September 1998 the Security Council recorded the displacement of 
over 230,000 persons from their homes, 50,000 of whom were estimated to be 
without any shelter and other basic necessities. It was the first wave of refugees 
who came to Northern Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were 
civilian massacres, also of women and children, including the massacre in the 
village of Račak.
9  However, it should be emphasized that unlike the Chechen rebels, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army never took any terrorist or other violent actions outside this province.
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At the end of 1998 the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population and de-
struction of their houses were suspended for a while, and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia consented to evacuate a larger number of its own military and police 
troops from this province. By Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998 the Security 
Council authorized the OSCE Verification Mission and the NATO Air Verifica-
tion Mission.
The Rambouillet Treaty, which the Serbian side refused to adopt, provided a 
peace-keeping mission, predominantly composed of the European NATO Mem-
ber States’ troops, provided further on that the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian 
police left that region, except the border units toward the third countries. The 
negotiations were conducted under the protection of the Contact Group. If they 
had succeeded, the mission would most likely have been approved by the Secu-
rity Council. It would probably also have included the forces from the Russian 
Federation, such as SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But this peace-keeping mis-
sion was also to assume civilian power, before democratic organs and new multi-
ethnic police were constituted.
The NATO enforcement action, previously unauthorized by the Security 
Council, followed after the Serbian side had refused to accept a pacific settlement 
that was in its favour (wide autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia, with substantial 
assurance of Serbian minority rights).
Concurrently with the NATO operation that started on 23 March 1999, the 
massacre of Albanian civilians began, who were exiled from Kosovo to an unprec-
edented extent. About 750,000 refugees must have been exiled to Albania, Mace-
donia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina that year. Their personal documents 
were destroyed at the border. This action must have been previously planned 
and was then conducted accordingly. More than a half of the Kosovo population 
were exiled from their homes, and many houses were reduced to rubble. Thus 
Milošević must have wanted to establish a numerical balance between Serbs and 
Albanians in this “Serbian” province.
The legality of the NATO operation should be briefly addressed at this point. 
The United States and Britain believe that the two Security Council resolutions 
on Kosovo adopted in 1998 contain indications similar to Resolution 668 of No-
vember 1990 with respect to Iraq, which allegedly provide authorization for an 
enforcement action. However, to avoid its prevention by the Russian and the 
Chinese veto, it would be more legally appropriate if a new resolution on this 
intervention had been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The international community in fact was faced with new challenges in this 
case. The peace-keeping mission with the approval of the Security Council and 
the consent of the Belgrade Government may only have observed ethnic cleansing 
and other international crimes, and would not be authorized to prevent and sanc-
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tion them. Thus the peace-keeping forces and their commanders may also be held 
personally co-responsible for their indirect participation (complicity) in the crime 
of genocide in accordance with Article 4(3e) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Namely, even today some French 
and British UNPROFOR generals in Bosnia-Herzegovina may objectively be at-
tributed with this responsibility: although they may have expected what was to 
happen, they did not take any actions to prevent the crime of genocide after the 
fall of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995.
At the end of the 20th century it was difficult for the Antifascist Coalition 
inspired by the principles of the Atlantic Pact of 1941 to stand idly and watch 
a larger repetition of crimes similar to the Nazi crimes in Second World War. 
Regardless of these humanitarian concerns, which should not be underestimated 
under any circumstances, these systematic and mass international crimes resulted 
in a large number of displaced and exiled innocent people. They caused destabili-
zation in the neighbouring countries and required enormous provision of material 
expenses by the international community.
In the opinion of the author of this paper, if it is impossible to achieve the 
same goal by any other means, the situation of this kind imposes a necessity of an 
intensive enforcement action as a last resort. Under such extreme circumstances 
in order to deter greater atrocities, an organized enforcement action of NATO 
forces would be justified by the legal principle that does not exclude a humanitar-
ian intervention, even if it was not approved by the Security Council owing to 
disagreement among the permanent Members due to their own internal political 
reasons.10 However, the wording of the UN Charter does not provide for an armed 
humanitarian intervention of this kind under extreme circumstances.
The enforcement action resulted in international administration over Kosovo. 
Nevertheless, this administration is no longer established on the humanitarian 
intervention, but on its acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reaf-
firmed by a new and comprehensive resolution of the Security Council, Resolu-
tion 1244 of 10 June 1999. Some significant provisions of this resolution were 
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are legally binding.
After Serbia had lost its control over Kosovo, some Albanians committed 
crimes, plundered and burnt houses, and also killed civilian Serbs and Romanies. 
These acts may have been acts of sheer retaliation, acts committed by criminal 
groups, or acts instigated by some criminal policies.11
10  See also – V. Đ. DEGAN: “Intervencija NATO snaga protiv Savezne Republike Jugoslavije: 
Pravna analiza”, Politička misao 1999, No. 4, pp. 79-99.
11  Veton Suroj, an Albanian intellectual, believed “organized fascism” was in the background of 
these crimes, and thus exposed himself to threats of his fellow countrymen.
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We, Croats, and other intellectuals from the Former Yugoslav countries were 
confronted with the same “bitter taste of victory”. We won in self-defence and 
in fight for bare survival, and preserved the independence of Croatia (and sub-
sequently also Bosnia-Herzegovina). Nonetheless, there was somebody who, on 
our behalf, plundered, committed violence, interned and killed civilians. First, 
they were the so-called “adversaries”, but subsequently the assets of fellow coun-
trymen were also plundered. The fact that among the perpetrators of these crimes 
there were only few real war heroes or real war victims is of little consolation. 
These people were mostly cowards in every respect. Any sensible man would 
wish these individuals be brought to justice, if not in their own country, then in 
the international community.
III - LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
The UN observer and peace-keeping operation in Croatia and Bosnia-Her-
zegovina failed mainly because territorial aggression and occupation by heav-
ily armed Serbian forces and the arms embargo required deployment of the UN 
armed forces with a clear mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter, as was the 
case in suppression of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.
Taking into account the practice of these observer and peacekeeping missions 
in other parts of the world as well, then their success in general depends on their 
mandate and the territorial circumstances they are deployed under. If the animosi-
ties persist, and hostile parties have not been separated, then the peace-keeping 
forces cannot impose peace. They cannot deter crimes against civilian population 
either, because they are allowed to use force only in self-defence, and need to 
be impartial toward all parties and enjoy confidence of all. Therefore, the armed 
forces deployed in a peace-keeping mission will fail if they need to impose peace 
by force and deter crimes, and take an enforcement action foreseen in Chapter 
VII of the Charter.
*
Finally, some observations need to be made at this point from the legal point 
of view. Students of some Croatian Faculties of Law and attendees of the Zagreb 
Diplomatic Academy do not learn anything about the above-mentioned. Politi-
cians and diplomats, as well as journalists being opinion-makers, have even less 
knowledge of these important legal matters.
Some bad examples from Croatian practice may be put forward. During con-
clusion of the Brijuni Agreement in the beginning of July 1991, the then member 
of the SFRY Presidency Stjepan Mesić was convinced that the unarmed OSCE 
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observers (“ice-cream makers”) would immediately also undertake their mission 
in Croatia. Although its headquarters were in Zagreb, its functions were initial-
ly only performed in Slovenia, where OSCE supervised the Yugoslav People’s 
Army withdrawal from Slovenia. Only following many subsequent tragic events, 
the mission’s functions were expanded to the territory of Croatia on 1 September 
1991, where they lasted until deployment of the UNPROFOR forces.
When in the beginning of 1992 Cyrus Vance assumed the function of a UN 
mediator, he managed to mislead both President Tuđman and Serbian President 
Milošević. Tuđman rightly expected that the UN forces would efficiently deter 
crimes in the UNPA zones, and that they would primarily ensure the return of all 
refugees to their homes and thus provide conditions for free elections in munici-
palities with the Serbian majority.
While Milošević accepted this mission, his intention was to create a situation 
that still exists in Cyprus, or e.g. South Ossetia and Transdniestria. He declared 
that UNPROFOR would defend Serbs from Croats, referring to the occupied ter-
ritories. He believed that afterwards he would continue to bargain to achieve a 
political solution. He dismissed the findings of the Badinter Arbitration Commit-
tee claiming they were allegedly unlawful.
Vance deceived both of them. Although armed, and despite its name (the 
United Nations Protection Force), this mission in Croatia was an observer mis-
sion, and not a peace-keeping mission. As above-mentioned, it did not interfere in 
the conflict and crimes committed, but rather strove to retain confidence of both 
hostile parties. Croatia needed the “Flash” and “Storm” operations to liberate 
its territories by itself in 1995. But during the process all plundering and crimes 
against the remaining Serbian civilians should have been deterred at any cost.
At that time the Croatian side acted in the state of necessity, which was mis-
used by foreign negotiators. The decisions were brought subsequently outside 
Croatia under the assumption that they had been a priori accepted by it.
However, the situation is not completely the same with regard to the cur-
rent dispute between the European Union and Croatia. When on 4 June 2004 in 
Brussels our State Secretary Hidajet Bišćević communicated the decision of the 
Parliament on deferred implementation of the Ecological and Fisheries Protec-
tion Zone with respect to the EU Member States, in presence of the Italian and 
the Slovene Secretaries, he should not have signed anything, including the agreed 
minutes of the meeting.
After he had done it, the Union Presidency brought a conclusion of the meet-
ing on 17 and 18 June that year whereby the Union “welcomes the agreement 
between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia achieved on the trilateral meeting on 4 June 
2004”. In that situation, our Ministry should have submitted a brief note to the 
Union Presidency. Therein it should have been written that the trilateral agree-
ment was not achieved at this meeting, as it would necessarily imply the same 
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obligations of Italy and Slovenia alike, and would be subject to ratification of the 
Parliament in accordance with Article 133 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia. This short unilateral statement would render the conclusion of the Union 
Presidency legally inopposable in respect to Croatia.
For small countries, it is better to have predictable politics. However, even 
though at the time the Croatian Government did not desire to challenge the be-
ginning of negotiations with the Union, the consequences of its silence cannot be 
avoided easily.
It will be long before our legal councillors thoroughly master different legal 
implications of different types of unilateral acts by States, as well as opposable 
situations that may appear or be avoided, and even longer before their superiors, 
diplomats and politicians, take their potential warnings seriously.
     (Translated by Hrvoja Heffer)
Sažetak
Promatračke misije i mirovne operacije u Hrvatskoj,  
Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu
Ovaj se članak bavi sustavom kolektivne sigurnosti prema glavama VI., VII. I 
VIII. Povelje Ujedinjenih Naroda. Promatračke misije i mirovne operacije nema-
ju eksplicitnu pravnu osnovu u tekstu Povelje. Oni su se razvili iz prakse. Temelje 
se na odlukama Vijeća sigurnosti, a ponekad čak i Opće skupštine.
Drugi dio ovoga članka posvećen je zaštitinim snagama UN-a (UNPRO-
FOR-u) u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini. Unatoč svojemu nazivu i naoružanju, 
UNPROFOR je u suštini bio prikrivena promatračka misija. Nije imao mandat 
za mirovnu operaciju, koji je hrvatska javnost od njega očekivala. Nije zaustavio 
zločine protiv civila u četiri dijela Hrvatske (UNPA zonama) koje su bile okupi-
rale pobunjeničke, paravojne i dobrovoljačke srpske postrojbe. Nije ni osigurao 
povratak prognanika njihovim kućama, što je bilo nužno za stvaranje uvjeta za 
slobodne i demokratske izbore u ovim hrvatskim područjima kojima je dodijeljen 
„poseban status“.
Mnogo je veća obmana bila s UNPROFOR-om u Bosni i Hercegovini. Izvor-
no promatračkoj misiji poput one u Hrvatskoj kasnije je povjerena ona mirovna, 
ali nikada s jasnim mandatom koji bi bio dovoljan za obnašanje dužnosti koje s 
postajale sve veće. Nikada nije bila ovlaštena uporabiti silu osim za potrebe sa-
moobrane ili osiguravanja prijevoza humanitarne pomoći. Primjerice, grad Sara-
jevo bio je opkoljen srpskim trupama od travnja 1992. do rujna 1995. uz golema 
stradanja civila, što je bilo duže i od opsade Lenjingrada u Drugome svjetskom 
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ratu. Nije bio spriječen genocid u Srebrenici koji se dogodio u lipnju 1995., iako 
je oružja bilo dovoljno, ali ne i volje da se to učini. Stoga je ta mirovna misija u 
Bosni i Hercegovini bila UN-ov fijasko, kao i ona u Somaliji 1993. godine.
Nakon zločina koje su srpske vlasti počinile protiv većinskoga albanskog sta-
novništva na Kosovu, u proljeće 1999.  uslijedila je NATO-va akcija bombardi-
ranja na teritoriju Savezne Republike Jugoslavije. Zbog oporbe Rusije i Kine, Vi-
jeće sigurnosti UN-a nije odobrilo tu akciju prema glavi VII. Povelje UN-a. Ovaj 
se članak posebice bavi problemom je li u krajnje nužnoj situaciji koja nalaže 
sprječavanje najgorega zla, humanitarna intervencija oružanih sila pravovaljana 
prema današnjemu međunarodnome pravu.
Ključne riječi: Kolektivna sigurnost Ujedinjenih naroda, prisilne mjere, mjere koje 
ne uključuju uporabu sile (oružanih snaga), promatračke misije, mirovne operacije, 
UNPROFOR, NATO
